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Khillwar is a mobile game developer from India faced growing competition. Its leadership position in India prompted 
it to scout out opportunities for growth outside the country. As a strategic move, the management team of Khillwar 
planned to expand into emerging markets and selected China as the new business battlefield. China seemed to be 
the promising land of opportunities for mobile game developers and operators. However, the Chinese market posed 
a number of significant challenges for foreign companies, making it risky to step into this market. This case 
discusses the opportunities and the key challenges associated with the decision to expand in China for an Indian 
mobile gaming software company such as Khillwar. The teaching case is focused on discussion of various issues 
that an IT company needs to consider when contemplating growth outside its country of origin. The students need to 
consider the pros and cons of expanding into the China market and make recommendations to the management of 
the Khillwar team on how to make the expansion smooth and successful. This case explains the challenges of 
expansion to a new IT market and, specifically, to a new emerging IT market for a successful IT company. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It was a sultry afternoon in June 2011. Bhrigu Mehta, the managing director of Khillwar, was heading to Shanghai for 
a one-week trip from Bangalore, India. In Shanghai, he would attend a week-long conference for Asian mobile game 
developers, and talk with some leading Chinese mobile game operators about the potential collaboration 
opportunities in the mobile gaming market. Bhrigu had to explore the current landscape of the Chinese mobile 
gaming industry so that he could convince his board of the need to expand in China. At the same time, he had the 
responsibility to scout out possible partners whom he could work with in Khillwar’s ambitious China mission. 
Since 2002, with the development of the national economy, the growing popularity of mobile services, as well as the 
huge improvement in the mobile networks infrastructure, mobile games had gradually become one of the most 
popular entertainment media in China. By 2009, the number of Chinese mobile gamers had reached 49.5 million, 
and was estimated to soar to 94.5 million by the end of 2013 [IDC, 2009]. With an ever-increasing customer base, 
the size of the Chinese mobile gaming market had reached nearly US$ 137.7 million by the end of September 2010 
[Enfodesk, 2010]. The booming Chinese mobile gaming market had presented the world with a huge developmental 
space. Although there were numerous game developers in China, none of them were large enough to dominate the 
entire mobile gaming market, and there were untapped opportunities for new entrants, particularly the innovative 
ones. 
The flight to Shanghai had been bumpy, but Bhrigu hoped that his trip in China would be smoother. Finishing his cup 
of lemon tea, he dug into the dossier that his market analyst had prepared. He wanted to be thorough in doing his 
homework before he met the Chinese game developers. His analyst had warned him: There were opportunities 
aplenty, but the Chinese dragon will be hard to tame. 
II. THE GLOBAL MOBILE GAMING INDUSTRY 
A Panorama of the Global Mobile Gaming Industry 
Around the globe, mobile gaming enjoyed a growing popularity. From 2005 to 2008, the number of mobile gamers 
soared from 55 million to 183 million, contributing to a global revenue of US$ 6.9 billion in 2008. The solid growth in 
the gaming industry could be attributed to several major factors. 
In the first place, the emergence of high-speed wireless networks played a leading role in enhancing user 
experiences, and driving the demand for mobile applications and Value Added Services (VAS). At the same time, 
development of mobile capabilities, such as touchscreens, 3D features, and online functionalities ushered in high-
quality mobile games, which formed the cornerstone of the mobile gaming market. Rapid economic growth had 
driven the development of the mobile gaming market. With the development of the emerging market economy, more 
and more people were able to afford mobile phones with 3G features, thereby further fueling the development of 
mobile applications and services. 
Besides, the mobile gaming market had several distinct characteristics, as discussed below: 
 Large potential customer base: The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimated that the 
number of mobile subscriptions around the globe would hit 5.3 billion before 2011, including 950 million 
3G service subscriptions [ITU, 2010]. The number of mobile users had already outstripped the number of 
computer users in every country, except the U.S. Accordingly, the potential market of mobile gaming 
might be much larger than the PC gaming market. 
 Portability: In comparison to game consoles and PCs, mobile games were not an ideal gaming platform 
due to limitations in the size, visual effect, and operability of the mobile devices. However, these 
disadvantages had largely been offset by the portability of mobile games in mobile devices, which helped 
remove the spatial limitations of having entertainment and made mobile games a popular choice for 
leisure gaming. 
 Low technical threshold and low entry barriers: The mobile gaming market around the world was 
fragmented because neither advanced technology nor enormous investment was needed for an 
incumbent to enter the mobile gaming market. 
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 Better accessibility: Different from traditional PC games, mobile games could be easily promoted through 
built-in menus of mobile devices, allowing gamers to directly connect to game platforms through a click. 
 Short product life cycles: The short shelf life of mobile games was a great concern for investors in the 
gaming industry [Fleming, 2008]. The average shelf-life of a mobile game was typically six to twelve 
months [Mariya, 2010], which made it extremely difficult to maintain customers in the long run. 
 Various mobile platforms: The presence of a large variety of mobile platforms, including iOS, Android, 
Symbian OS, Windows Mobile, and J2ME, drove the demand for cross-platform compatibilities. 
India Mobile Gaming Market 
At an estimated size of US$ 40 million, the Indian mobile gaming industry contributed more than 5 percent of the 
total mobile VAS revenue [FICCI and KPMG, 2009]. With the increasing penetration of data-enabled handsets and a 
huge subscriber base of 500 million [Ribeiro, 2009], it was estimated that the Indian telecommunications industry 
would continue to grow in 2011. However, in sharp contrast to expectations, the mobile gaming industry in India had 
experienced sluggish growth. The annual report of Indiagames Ltd., the largest online games developer and 
publisher in India, stated that there were four major factors that retarded the growth of the gaming industry. These 
included limited awareness of gaming products, shortage of infrastructure, and dropping ARPU (Average Revenue 
per User) and size of wallet. Furthermore, rampant piracy was another problem that threatened the development of 
the mobile gaming industry. It was estimated that more than US$ 500 million would be lost in India because of piracy 
every year. Game developers identified the high piracy rate as one of the biggest challenges in expanding their 
business in India [Sinha, 2007]. 
With one of the world’s highly talented pool of programmers, India had become the center of a booming IT industry. 
The huge development potential of the mobile gaming market had always attracted numerous Indian companies to 
invest in this industry. Prominent Indian companies in the mobile gaming industry included Indiagames, MAUJ 
Mobile, and Zapak. (as shown in Table 1). A number of smaller players are not shown in this table. These 
companies followed different business models and revenue models. The list of prominent business models is shown 
in Table 2. Indiagames adopted a typical integrated model, playing the role of developer, publisher, and distributor 
and would reach its customers through its own websites. Trine Entertainment followed a co-publishing model, 
sharing its revenue with game developers. The other companies followed a service development model, uniquely 
working as game developers. These companies generally reached customers through network operators. In the 
service development model, mobile game developers could keep only 40 to 50 percent of the total revenue 
generated from the selling of mobile games, while the remainder was shared with mobile network operators [Tata 
Strategic Management Group, 2010]. 
Table 1: Key Gaming Companies in the India Mobile Gaming Market 
Company 
Name 
Year of 
Establishment 
Services Capital Size as %age of 
Khillwar’s Capital Size 
Indiagames 1999  Mobile game development 
 Online game development 
 Game distribution 
67% 
MAUJ Mobile 1997  Mobile content and applications 
 Mobile software and services 
 Mobile media solutions 
56% 
Zapak 1995  Cross-platform game development 
 Publishing for the self developed content 
54% 
Games2win 2000  Mobile game development 
 Outsourced game content creation services 
provider 
51% 
Dhruva 1997  Cross-platform game development 
 Outsourced game content creation 
48%  
Nazara 
Technologies 
2001  Cross-platform game development 
 Outsourced game content creation services 
provider 
42% 
Trine 
Entertainment 
2006  Mobile game development 
 Online game development 
 Game distribution 
39% 
Hungama 1999  Cross-platform game development 
 Outsourced game content creation 
37% 
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Table 2: Typical Business Models In the Indian Mobile Gaming Market 
Business Model Description Example(s) Revenue Model 
Integrated 
Model 
Served as the developer, 
publisher, and distributor of own 
games at the same time. 
Indiagames Revenue consisted of sales of 
games, advertising, games 
licensing, etc. 
Co-publishing 
Model 
Game development companies 
and game publishers jointly 
invested in game development. 
Trine 
Entertainment 
Revenue sharing with game 
publishers. 
Service 
Development 
Model 
Worked as third party developer 
to develop the games conceived 
by publishers or developers. 
Dhruva, 
Games2win, 
Hungama, MAUJ 
Mobile, Nazara, 
Zapak 
Revenue based on billable hours 
for the project. Or formed 
partnership with game operators 
and shared revenue with the 
partner. 
Source: Animation and Gaming Industry in India 2010 
[TATA Strategic Management Group, 2010] 
The cluster of excellent companies intensified the competition within the country. As a response, Indian companies 
started to seek out partnerships from outside the country and set out to penetrate the global mobile gaming markets. 
Zapak scouted for joint venture opportunities in Russia and there was a rumor that they had invested US$ 1 million 
to acquire games from developers in Eastern Europe. Games2win received 5.1 million unique visitors from all 
around the world, and the users from the U.S. constituted 13.9 percent of Games2win’s total number of visitors. In 
July 2010, Nazara Technologies formed a partnership with EA mobile, a division of Nasdaq listed as Electronic Arts. 
This partnership led to some joint effort in the development of innovative mobile games. In addition, Indiagames 
worked in a partnership arrangement with Nokia since 2001. The two companies worked together to develop state-
of-the-art games, and the partnership was further enhanced in 2007 when Indiagames developed gaming services 
for the new NGage platform of Nokia. This long-term partnership added to the reputation and strength of both 
companies and helped the two companies survive in the competitive market. 
China Mobile Gaming Market 
As the largest emerging economy in the world, China was the star performer in aggregate GDP growth in the 1980s 
[Srinivasan, 2004]. China developed rapidly with its expansion through manufacturing until 1990s. In 2002 and 2003, 
the GDP growth rate of China reached 8 and 9 percent respectively [Lai, 2006], far exceeding the world’s average 
during that period. China’s economic growth largely resulted from the conscious investment of the central 
government. As a result of government intervention in domestic capital markets, China quickly developed hardware 
infrastructure including ports, roads, and power. At the same time, Chinese government adopted a series of policies 
to encourage foreign direct investment, and this drove China’s GDP growth during 1999–2002. However, the 
government control also eroded the flexibility of local companies as well as the average work efficiency of the 
indigenous population. Furthermore, the development of high-end industries in China was confined to the cities due 
to the distinct gap between urban and rural areas. 
By June 2005, the number of Internet users in China surpassed 100 million, and China ranked as number 2 in the 
world, right behind the U.S. with 211 million users (as shown in Table 3). More than 71 percent of China’s Internet 
users were younger than thirty [Ji and Meeker, 2005]. Among these users, the two largest groups of users were 
company employees and students. Figure 1 shows the profiles of the mobile Internet users in China. 
Table 3: China Leads the World in Mobile Subscribers and Ranks No. 2 in Internet Users 
 
Country 
Mobile 
Phones (mil) 
Internet 
Users (mil) 
Mobile Phone to 
Internet User Ratio 
Installed PCs 
(mil) 
China 363 100 3.6:1 53 
U.S. 177 211 0.8:1 207 
Japan 88 78 1.1:1 55 
Germany 69 51 1.4:1 39 
UK 54 37 1.5:1 26 
Italy 54 32 1.7:1 16 
S.Korea 37 32 1.2:1 27 
Source: Morgan Stanley Equity Research Global [Ji and Meeker, 2005] 
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Source: CLSA Report [CLSA, 2010] 
Figure 1. Profiles of Mobile Internet Users in China 
Furthermore, 3G services were becoming popular in China. The total number of 3G users in China reached 16.06 
million in February 2011. At the same time, the Chinese government planned to invest US$ 58.6 billion for 3G 
development. It was estimated that the total number of 3G services subscribers in China would hit 150 million by the 
end of 2011 [Xinhua, 2010]. At the same time, competition between Chinese telecommunications companies drove 
down the price of General Packet Radio Service (GPRS). This was expected to contribute to the increasing 
popularity of 3G services in China in the near future. 
The three dominant mobile operators in China included China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile. In May 
2009, China Unicom became a pioneer in the Chinese mobile market by launching its first mobile payment services. 
Subsequently, China Mobile acquired 20 percent share of Shanghai Pudong Development Bank in order to establish 
a reliable mobile payment platform in the future. China UnionPay had already tested mobile payment services in six 
cities and regions. In May 2010, eighteen Chinese banks, together with three major mobile operators and a number 
of handset manufacturers formed the Mobile Payment Industry Alliance. After its beginning, the alliance built up a 
single, open platform that could facilitate near field communication and mobile payment services throughout China 
[ChinaPaymentsNews.com, 2010]. 
The Chinese mobile gaming market kept on growing since 2007. The number of mobile users in China increased 
nearly fourfold from 207 million in 2002 to 747 million in 2009 [ResearchInChina, 2010]. By the end of 2010, while 
the mobile market in developed countries reached a saturation level, the developing world increased the mobile 
market share from 53 percent in 2005 to 73 percent [Aircel India Limited, 2010]. Driven by the increasing number of 
mobile and Internet users, popularity of 3G services, and decreasing GPRS fees, the Chinese mobile gaming market 
enjoyed a strong upward momentum. In 2009, the size of the mobile gaming market in China reached US$ 240 
million, with the year-to-year growth rate of 38.5 percent. It was expected that the mobile gaming market in China 
would reach US$ 2.5 billion in 2014 [Telecomasia.net, 2010]. Figure 2 shows the change of the Chinese mobile 
gaming market over the years (2004–2011), in terms of market size and the year-on-year rate of growth. 
The most popular mobile games in China were casual games [Interfax News Service, 2007]. The casual games 
were limited by the operational performance, display capability, and battery capacity of handsets, and required no 
special skills to play. Still, they became the top choice for mobile gamers. Other popular game categories included 
battle games, massively multiplayer online games, and role-playing games [CLSA, 2010]. 
With the expansion of China’s mobile gaming market, numerous mobile game operators sprang up. Figure 3 shows 
the mobile gaming value chain [Kontio, 2011]. Table 4 provides a summary of activities performed by the key players 
in the mobile gaming value chain. Game operators were middlemen who obtained games from game developers or 
in-house game development teams, and focused on game selling instead of game development. By 2008, there 
were approximately 120 game operators operating nearly 200 online games in China [Palmade and Anayiotas, 
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Source: Enfodesk [2010] 
Figure 2. Growth of the Chinese Mobile Gaming Market  
 
2004]. In terms of revenue, Giant Interactive, Shanda, Tencent, NetEase, Sina, and Kong.net were China’s leading 
online game operators. Game operators generally had three ways to reach the customers: (1) promote mobile 
games through self-developed Web pages, (2) offer content to handset makers such as Nokia and Sony Ericsson, 
and (3) offer content to major Chinese network operators. While most small- and medium-sized game operators 
reached customers in less direct ways through handset makers and network operators, the top game operators 
including Shanda, NetEase, and Tencent, which already enjoyed a strong reputation and boasted a stable customer 
group, directly reached the customers through Web pages to avoid revenue sharing with handset makers and 
network operators. 
Among the top three game operators, Shanda was a specialized game operator that had already established its 
reputation in the gaming industry for many years, while Tencent and NetEase were big players in other fields 
including telecommunications, Web news, social networking, etc. With the vision of building the largest gaming 
operation in China, Shanda had actively acquired a few mobile game developers and distributors and had developed 
an integrated developer–operator business model. As a specialized game operator, Shanda had kept its leading 
position in China for many years. However, in 2010, Tencent beat this top mobile game operator in generating 
mobile gaming revenue. As a response, Shanda absorbed Eyedentity, a Korean mobile game developer, through a 
US$ 95 million acquisition, with the hope of maintaining its market leadership through the development of new 
mobile games [Shriber, 2010]. 
Apart from game operators, the number of game developers in China had also increased. However, more than 90 
percent of the game developers were small and medium enterprises with less than twenty full-time employees 
[Nuoda Consulting, 2009]. There was still no leading game developer that dominated the mobile gaming market in 
China. In order to survive in the competitive environment, most mobile game developers needed to seek support 
from leading game operators that possessed abundant capital and had direct access to customers. In fact, 
numerous game developers had already merged and integrated with leading game operators such as Shanda, 
Tencent, and NetEase after operating on their own for a short time. 
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Figure 3. Mobile Gaming Value Chain 
 
Table 4: Key Players in the Mobile Gaming Value Chain 
Key Players Roles 
Licensing Companies Provided license and copyright protection for newly developed games 
Game Developers Developed and tested mobile games 
Provided mobile games to game operators, mobile network operators, 
and handset makers 
Did not have direct access to mobile gaming consumers 
Focused on technical aspects instead of marketing aspects 
Game Operators Offered games for sale 
Either developed games using in-house development teams or 
purchased mobile games from game developers 
Accessed customers through Value Added Services provided by 
network operators, through self-developed operations and promotion 
platform or provided games to handset makers 
Focused more on marketing aspects 
Mobile Network Operators Provided mobile network services 
Offered mobile games through Value Added Services 
Developed official platform for Value Added Services 
Handset Makers Manufactured handsets, embedded mobile operating systems and 
specific functionalities into the handset 
Embedded mobile games into mobile handsets as built-in games 
Mobile Gaming Customers Downloaded mobile games through mobile networks or WiFi, or played 
embedded games on handsets 
 
The performance of local game developers was far from satisfactory. Stereotyped game content was a major 
problem area. Most of the locally developed games were imitations of their previous circulated games or foreign 
products. Since the online mobile payment platform in China was still not mature, there were three basic pricing 
models in use. One was to provide trial versions of the gaming software to customers and then charge a 
subscription fee after the trial period was over. The second method of payment was to charge a fixed amount of fee 
for unlimited use of gaming services. Another involved the download-charging method, in which gamers were 
allowed to experience the game as a free service, but were charged for downloading add-ons and accessories that 
helped to increase points or that enhanced the game playing experience. 
III. KHILLWAR AND ITS GROWTH STRATEGY 
Founded in 1995, Khillwar was one of the older Indian gaming companies. Led by Bhrigu Mehta, the company 
started its business from Bangalore, the ―Silicon Valley‖ of India. The name Khillwar meant ―gaming device‖ or ―toy‖ 
in Hindi, and it was coined by Bhrigu because of its phonetic similarity with ―Kill War.‖ It was not coincidental that the 
first game that came out from Khillwar was a war game with excellent special effects. Khillwar was a gaming 
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company with an integrated developer–publisher model and offered PC games and television games to Indian game 
operators. With its deep knowledge of cutting-edge computer graphics technology and high-quality technical staff, 
Khillwar also provided a wide variety of game-related services, including game publishing, game testing, and 
outsourced game development services. Table 5 shows the different service offerings of Khillwar. 
Table 5: Khillwar’s Service Offerings 
Content Creation  Identification of market needs and trends 
 Design of animation, art, audio, design/script, and music 
Game Development  Game design and programming in Artificial Intelligence 
 Engine programming and engine modifications (for both 2D and 3D engines) 
 Tool development (for both core and casual games) 
 Platform porting 
 Network and online development 
 End-to-end outsourced game development (PC, online, PS2/PS3/PSP and 
Xbox Live arcade titles) 
Game Testing  Compatibility testing 
 Compliance testing 
 Functional testing 
 International localization 
Game Publishing  Quality assurance for all devices and platforms 
 Product submissions and deployment across global markets 
 Localization for over 24 markets 
 Porting of games across multi-platform and mobile devices 
In 1997, the successful launch of Warrior I, a PC game which soon became the best-seller in India, helped Khillwar 
gain its reputation in the market. After that, the company successively launched a series of PC and television 
games. In 1999, the online gaming market started to develop in India. As one of the largest game development 
companies in India, Khillwar recognized the opportunity of building its leadership in the Indian online gaming market. 
However, in order to expand its business and seek opportunities in the emerging online gaming market, Khillwar 
needed to capture the requirements of online consumers. By the end of 1999, Khillwar formed a joint venture with 
Reliant Communication Infrastructure Ltd., and together they launched twenty-eight online games in the following 
year. This strategic move helped Khillwar seize more than 58 percent of the market share. After the successful 
launch of online games, Khillwar became the top online game provider in India. At the end of 2000, in order to 
expand capability and maintain leadership in the online gaming market, Khillwar acquired Bhatia Groups, an Indian 
IT company specializing in online services. After this US$ 10 million acquisition, Khillwar became the largest gaming 
company in India. 
In 2001, in response to the increasing market demand for mobile games, Khillwar launched its first mobile casual 
game—Tickles. Due to the unique design of the gaming interface, Tickles immediately gained popularity and soon 
ranked as the most favorite game in India in 2001. Subsequently in 2002, the company launched a series of mobile 
games, and gradually moved its focus from PC and television games to the more portable and flexible casual mobile 
games. In order to better promote the casual mobile games, the company formed partnerships with a few smaller 
Indian game operators such as AirBus and GWin. Khillwar continued to provide new gaming products to the Indian 
game operators for the next few years, portraying itself as a company that valued innovation and was not afraid to 
experiment with new and often risky technologies. 
Khillwar offered a wide variety of gaming products for different platforms (Table 6). In 2010, the game Circle C—a 
casual mobile game which was developed on Symbian OS, became the best-selling mobile game in India. With the 
popularity of 3G services and the Android mobile platform, the mobile games based on iOS and Android platforms 
attracted gamers’ attention and interest. In order to follow the market trend, Khillwar transferred some of the 
Symbian-based mobile games to new platforms and became the first cross-platform game provider in India. In 2010, 
the business of Khillwar continued to grow. The customer base of Khillwar reached 32 million by the end of the year, 
and it witnessed a 32 percent growth, compared with 2008. In 2010, Khillwar’s profit reached US$ 2.6 million, and it 
ranked as the number one game developer in India. 
Khillwar’s strengths were its qualified professional team, as well as its open and innovative company culture, which it 
followed very successfully. As the leading game developer in India, Khillwar never underestimated the value of its 
talented employees. When the company was first formed, Bhrigu Mehta put a huge amount of effort in recruiting 
thirty-five talented programmers and game designers from all over the country. Over time these people became the 
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Bhrigu Mehta 
Managing Director 
Kavita Shah 
Human  
Resource  
Manager 
Nandita 
Chandra 
Project 
Manager 
Kamal 
Gupta 
Operations 
Manager 
Brinda 
Sheth 
Marketing 
Manager 
Karuna 
Sinha 
Finance 
Manager 
Hemant Sood 
Project  
Lead 
Narayan Rao 
Project  
Lead 
Ruby Sen 
Project  
Lead 
Table 6: Khillwar’s Product Offerings (2009–2010) 
Platforms Products 
Smartphones J2SE Circle C, Tickles, Numero, etc. 
Symbian OS 
iOS 
Android 
Windows Mobile 
Consoles Nintendo DS Route 6, Tomb, Panther, Masti, 
Dhamal, Sketchy, etc. Nintendo Wii 
Playstation 
PSP 
Desktops Windows Pyramids, Mahal, Great 
Kingdoms, etc. Mac OS 
most experienced technical managers and project managers and formed the foundation of Khillwar. In recent years, 
with the expansion of the company, the management groups of Khillwar continuously absorbed skillful game 
developers and maintained a large pool of talent through a high salary, attractive package of benefits, and a friendly 
company culture. 
We value our employees very much. They are among the top programmers … even in the world. They are 
smart, hard-working, responsible, and experienced. With these people onboard, we are able to produce the 
most innovative and exquisite mobile games and gain a good reputation in the market. They are the 
foundation of our company and they get good rewards. Employee turnover is not a concern here. People 
stay on because they love their work, and the independence that comes with it. 
Kamal Gupta, Operations Manager of Khillwar 
In order to attract and retain high quality staff and allow meaningful communication of ideas, Khillwar adopted a flat 
organizational structure, which allowed for free communications between managers and employees. The company 
adopted a system of reward to encourage innovation and new ideas. The top management promoted innovation and 
viewed it as the core strength of its business throughout the organization. Figure 4 shows Khillwar’s organizational 
chart including the top managers. 
 
Figure 4. Organization Chart at Khillwar 
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Bhrigu Mehta, the managing director of Khillwar, was a strong believer of continuous improvement: 
Our team members never stop seeking out new ideas and opportunities. The market environment is such 
that if you stop, others will catch up and eventually eliminate you from the competitive environment. The 
only way you survive is through continuous change. One way of change is through innovation and we have 
gone all out for doing that. The other way is through expansion. You can seek new opportunities in a 
changing environment. We already have a talented pool of skillful and innovative people. And I believe we 
have the ability to turn any change into a value added activity. 
Bhrigu Mehta, Managing Director of Khillwar 
Guided by the philosophy of change, Khillwar was never complacent with the success that it had achieved in a short 
time span and was always seeking out new opportunities. In 2004, as a part of its mission of strategic change, the 
company started to expand its business to the U.S. A head office was established in Sacramento, California, to 
facilitate the game development business in the U.S., and thirty programmers were relocated to the U.S. With its 
excellent technical capability, Khillwar provided game development and testing services for a number of U.S. game 
operators. The business in the U.S. was profitable and helped Khillwar build up its reputation for a large client group. 
In 2007, as an attempt to further penetrate the U.S. market, Khillwar launched a series of casual games together 
with the largest American mobile network operator—Verizon Wireless. This was widely touted as a major success 
and helped Khillwar gain 12 percent increase in its total revenue. The American experience made Khillwar more 
confident and interested in increasing its global reach. 
IV. EXPANSION TO THE CHINESE MARKET 
Encouraged by the success in the U.S., the management group of Khillwar saw the potential of stepping out of India 
and becoming a world-class gaming company. With this vision, the company started making plans to expand its 
customer base and increase its presence in other countries. In 2010, Khillwar started to look for opportunities in the 
less mature markets in Asia, and especially the market with the largest potential—China. 
As the world’s largest developing economy, China is expanding rapidly, and so is the Chinese mobile 
gaming market. In Shanghai, I witnessed the popularity of mobile games. You can see people playing 
mobile games, everywhere—on the bus, in the café, in the subway, at the Bund…. There are so many 
people who love playing mobile games. Wow! This can be a huge market for us. 
Bhrigu Mehta, Managing Director of Khillwar 
Characterized by a large number of avid mobile users, improved mobile network infrastructure, as well as increasing 
popularity of mobile games, the mobile gaming market in China presented a bright future for game developers and 
operators. Given the large market size, there was room for more competition in China. Furthermore, the supply of 
quality games in the Chinese market lagged behind demand. Although there were a large number of mobile games 
circulating in the Chinese market, the quality of these games were far from satisfactory. The content of these games 
was more or less the same. Most games were simply copies of existing ones. Also, the interface design was not 
good and there was no serious attempt to continuously improve the features or incorporate the latest technologies in 
them. Limited by their size as well as lack of technical know-how, most Chinese local game developers were not 
capable of delving into high-quality game development. Although there were numerous game developers in China, 
none of them had gained a high reputation in the industry, and there were still no leading game developers in the 
Chinese market. The market was largely fragmented. In order to meet the demand for high quality mobile games, 
most mobile operators spent huge amounts to acquire mobile games from Korea and Japan. The lack of quality 
game developers presented Khillwar with a unique opportunity to enter the unknown and unexplored Chinese 
market and take up a leadership role. 
However, coupled with the opportunities also came a number of risks. The Chinese gaming market was largely 
immature and suffered from numerous problems. Karuna Sinha, the finance manager of Khillwar was concerned 
about the payment problems in China. By 2010, there was still no efficient and reliable mobile payment platform in 
China. In 2009, China UnionPay, China Unicom, and China Mobile worked together to develop a reliable mobile 
payment platform. However, it was not yet fully tested and accepted by the game operators. In addition, the low 
penetration rate of credit cards in China was another well-known obstacle of online business development in China. 
If Khillwar was to enter into the Chinese market, they would have to alter their practice of collecting payments using 
credit cards and come up with a new method of payment collection that was reliable, secure, and easily acceptable 
for the Chinese consumers. 
Brinda Sheth, the marketing manager, raised another concern about entering the Chinese market, and this 
concerned the attitude of Chinese consumers toward a largely unknown foreign player. 
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As a new entrant into the Chinese market, our first step will be to understand customer needs and tastes. 
Mobile games are all about user experiences. If users don’t like your style, they will not subscribe to your 
games. So we need to know the preferences of Chinese customers and whether they like pictures, 
background music, color, and other details. However, it will be difficult for us to collect these data since, you 
know, the language problems as well as cultural problems are present. Maybe what we understand is 
actually different from what the customer really wants, and that can lead to failure. Another problem is that 
for Chinese customers, we are still strangers. No one knows our name or our products in China. It may 
require a lot of effort and a long time to build reputation in China. We know we need to do that, but we are 
simply unaware how this can be done. 
Brinda Sheth, Marketing Manager of Khillwar 
In order to penetrate the Chinese market, Khillwar needed to grasp the tastes and preferences of the Chinese 
customers. However, conducting market research by themselves was both time-consuming and inefficient because 
of cultural barriers. Furthermore, since the Chinese market already had some mobile operators, such as Shanda, 
Tencent and NetEase, which occupied a healthy market share in the mobile gaming industry, it was difficult for 
Khillwar to compete with these operators as the new kid in the block. 
Apart from the above issues, language-related problems also posed challenges for Khillwar. In the first place, due to 
the mismatch in the language, original mobile gaming interfaces developed by Khillwar for its customers in India and 
the U.S. would no longer be reusable. Since Chinese consumers usually preferred Chinese interfaces for their 
mobile games, it became an urgent issue for Khillwar to develop Chinese-language-based mobile games. Nandita 
Chandra, a project manager in Khillwar expressed her concern about the language problems of interface design: 
As I know, English proficiency is very low in China. If we develop the games in English as before, some 
gamers simply cannot understand it and will not subscribe to our games. Actually, almost 99 percent of the 
Chinese mobile games are written in Chinese. If we want to capture a large market share, we have to 
develop Chinese versions of our games. However, the problem is that simple translation is far from enough. 
You need to understand the linguistic practice and preferences of Chinese gamers. You also need to know 
what kind of format they like to see. It will be a tough challenge for us. 
Nandita Chandra, Project Manager at Khillwar 
Kavita Shah, the human resource manager, felt that recruitment and retention issues for employees might become a 
major headache. If the company were to establish business in China, they would need to decide whether to relocate 
Indian engineers to China at high cost, or to hire local talent at a relatively low cost. If Khillwar were to hire local 
technicians, how would the Indian managers communicate with the programmers who would translate the English 
interfaces into Chinese and develop interfaces specially geared to Chinese customers. Kavita worried that 
communication barriers could even lead to poor efficiency and low morale among employees. She was also not sure 
where in China they should establish their development office. Shanghai seemed to be an obvious choice. But she 
was not sure if Shanghai could supply her with the programming talent that she needed. 
Social Gaming 
There was another major area of concern that bothered Bhrigu. The Chinese mobile gaming companies were 
moving fast toward development of games for social networking sites. All over the world, the social networking fever 
had spread very fast, and recent research showed that the percentage of mobile phone subscribers who were also 
mobile social network users grew from 2.7 percent in 2007 to 9.5 percent in 2010, and was estimated to reach 18.8 
percent in 2012 [eMarketer, 2008]. China was no exception to this craze. The world leader in social networking 
Facebook was accessible in China only through Web-based services or proxies. Access was erratic, as the Chinese 
government made a conscious effort to block out such services from time to time [Anonymous, 2011]. While 
Facebook was not freely accessible for the Chinese netizens, the market led by domestic social networking 
providers was growing fast. Companies like RenRen, Kaixin001, Qzone, and 51.com were the top players [Lukoff, 
2010]. Games were a popular application on these websites in addition to chatting, photo sharing, blogging, etc. 
RenRen had an open platform and encouraged third parties to supply them innovative games. The other social 
networking sites mostly imitated the games that appeared on Renren. Bhrigu read in a news article that Shanda was 
getting ready to supply games to RenRen [Chang, 2011]. There was also a rumor that Shanda was looking to 
acquire a company from Asia with expertise in that niche area. There was a pent-up demand for social games for 
these popular sites and leading game developers like Shanda were ready to explore this opportunity. 
China’s netizens are becoming more mature, they are becoming more accustomed to paying for gaming, 
and social gaming market opportunities will definitely continue to increase in the future. 
Shaofei Gan, CEO of 5 Minutes [Backaler, 2010] 
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Although Indians had taken to social networking with almost the same frenzy as the Chinese, there was absence of 
a leading domestic social networking site in India. Initially, Orkut was the most popular social networking site, but 
over the years it was Facebook that began to dominate the market. While the number of Facebook users increased 
from 11.24 million in November 2009 to 27.14 million in November 2010, the number of Orkut users remained stable 
[Agarwal, 2011]. The domestic social networking site BigAdda that gained some popularity among the Indian crowd 
announced that it would close down its social networking part of the website and migrate to an e-commerce portal 
[Vikas, 2011]. Khillwar never got involved with any social networking websites. Both Facebook and Orkut were off-
limits for them, and gaming had not caught on as a popular application in any of the domestic social networking sites 
in India. Although Bhrigu’s team had competent engineers who were quick learners and innovators, their total lack of 
experience in dealing with games for social networking sites concerned him. Would it make sense to go for 
development of social games in addition to mobile games for the Chinese market? Were social games just an 
extension of mobile games involving multiple players or were they totally different because they took advantage of 
the social ties between the players on a social networking site? Would this new direction help Khillwar build and 
leverage a market that was hitherto unknown in India? Would his programmers be able to grasp the nuances of 
social game design and come up with such games for the Chinese audience? 
My definition of a social game is a game that has a very gentle learning curve, easy-to-understand UI, and 
lives on a social network taking advantage of your friendships in meaningful ways within the game. We’re at 
the beginning of this style of games, and we’re learning so much at a breakneck pace about the play 
patterns and desires of the largest gaming segment any game designers have addressed, and it’s very 
exciting. These games are predominantly free-to-play and employ microtransactions as a business model, 
which presents very interesting challenges for game designers. 
John Romero, Chief Creative Officer at Loot Drop [Lovell, 2011] 
Social games like HappyFarm where players manage a virtual farm and often sneak in to steal items from 
their neighbor’s farm are already very popular in China. The very agricultural tone of the game appeals to a 
number of Chinese, like youth from rural areas, their middle-aged parents, and retirees, who are still 
passionate about farming. But software designers must have a good understanding of the societal norms 
and the societal makeup of a country in order to come up with such meaningful social games. We know too 
little about the Chinese society to come up with innovative game designs that will appeal to Chinese 
customers. I’m not sure if the same HappyFarm will be at all popular among the Indian netizens who are 
mostly from the cities and probably do not care so much about a farming game. 
Narayan Rao, Project Lead at Khillwar 
V. LOOKING AHEAD 
With both opportunities and risks ahead, Bhrigu Mehta and the management team of Khillwar needed to weigh 
carefully the pros and cons of the decision to enter the Chinese market. China was the promising land for mobile 
gaming developers given the considerable potential customer base that was present in the Chinese market and the 
absence of a strong domestic or international player. Khillwar could bring its very innovative work culture and its 
history of success in India and the U.S. to China. The stakes were high, but the risks were formidable. The 
immaturity of the Chinese mobile gaming market posed significant challenges for any mobile gaming operator, 
making it doubly risky for a non-Chinese IT company to step into the market. Bhrigu had to decide whether the 
payoffs would be higher than the risks. If Khillwar decided to enter the China mobile gaming market, the challenge 
would lie in how to fight against issues such as payment problems, language barriers, recruitment of talent, and 
tough competition from incumbents and other new entrants. There was also the issue of whether Khillwar should 
move into development of social games that were becoming increasingly popular in China. Was Khillwar game 
enough to shoulder these challenges? 
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